PostgreSQL has native support for using SSL connections to encrypt client/server communications for increased security. See 18.9절 for details about the server-side SSL functionality.
libpq reads the system-wide
OpenSSL configuration file. By default, this
file is named openssl.cnf
and is located in the
directory reported by openssl version -d
. This default
can be overridden by setting environment variable
OPENSSL_CONF
to the name of the desired configuration
file.
By default, PostgreSQL will not perform any verification of the server certificate. This means that it is possible to spoof the server identity (for example by modifying a DNS record or by taking over the server IP address) without the client knowing. In order to prevent spoofing, the client must be able to verify the server's identity via a chain of trust. A chain of trust is established by placing a root (self-signed) certificate authority (CA) certificate on one computer and a leaf certificate signed by the root certificate on another computer. It is also possible to use an “intermediate” certificate which is signed by the root certificate and signs leaf certificates.
To allow the client to verify the identity of the server, place a root certificate on the client and a leaf certificate signed by the root certificate on the server. To allow the server to verify the identity of the client, place a root certificate on the server and a leaf certificate signed by the root certificate on the client. One or more intermediate certificates (usually stored with the leaf certificate) can also be used to link the leaf certificate to the root certificate.
Once a chain of trust has been established, there are two ways for
the client to validate the leaf certificate sent by the server.
If the parameter sslmode
is set to verify-ca
,
libpq will verify that the server is trustworthy by checking the
certificate chain up to the root certificate stored on the client.
If sslmode
is set to verify-full
,
libpq will also verify that the server host
name matches the name stored in the server certificate. The
SSL connection will fail if the server certificate cannot be
verified. verify-full
is recommended in most
security-sensitive environments.
In verify-full
mode, the host name is matched against the
certificate's Subject Alternative Name attribute(s), or against the
Common Name attribute if no Subject Alternative Name of type dNSName
is
present. If the certificate's name attribute starts with an asterisk
(*
), the asterisk will be treated as
a wildcard, which will match all characters except a dot
(.
). This means the certificate will not match subdomains.
If the connection is made using an IP address instead of a host name, the
IP address will be matched (without doing any DNS lookups).
To allow server certificate verification, one or more root certificates
must be placed in the file ~/.postgresql/root.crt
in the user's home directory. (On Microsoft Windows the file is named
%APPDATA%\postgresql\root.crt
.) Intermediate
certificates should also be added to the file if they are needed to link
the certificate chain sent by the server to the root certificates
stored on the client.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries are also checked
if the file ~/.postgresql/root.crl
exists
(%APPDATA%\postgresql\root.crl
on Microsoft
Windows).
The location of the root certificate file and the CRL can be changed by
setting
the connection parameters sslrootcert
and sslcrl
or the environment variables PGSSLROOTCERT
and PGSSLCRL
.
For backwards compatibility with earlier versions of PostgreSQL, if a
root CA file exists, the behavior of
sslmode
=require
will be the same
as that of verify-ca
, meaning the server certificate
is validated against the CA. Relying on this behavior is discouraged,
and applications that need certificate validation should always use
verify-ca
or verify-full
.
If the server attempts to verify the identity of the
client by requesting the client's leaf certificate,
libpq will send the certificates stored in
file ~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt
in the user's home
directory. The certificates must chain to the root certificate trusted
by the server. A matching
private key file ~/.postgresql/postgresql.key
must also
be present. The private
key file must not allow any access to world or group; achieve this by the
command chmod 0600 ~/.postgresql/postgresql.key
.
On Microsoft Windows these files are named
%APPDATA%\postgresql\postgresql.crt
and
%APPDATA%\postgresql\postgresql.key
, and there
is no special permissions check since the directory is presumed secure.
The location of the certificate and key files can be overridden by the
connection parameters sslcert
and sslkey
or the
environment variables PGSSLCERT
and PGSSLKEY
.
The first certificate in postgresql.crt
must be the
client's certificate because it must match the client's private key.
“Intermediate” certificates can be optionally appended
to the file — doing so avoids requiring storage of intermediate
certificates on the server (ssl_ca_file).
The certificate and key may be in PEM or ASN.1 DER format.
The key may be
stored in cleartext or encrypted with a passphrase using any algorithm supported
by OpenSSL, like AES-128. If the key is stored encrypted, then the passphrase
may be provided in the sslpassword connection
option. If an encrypted key is supplied and the sslpassword
option is absent or blank, a password will be prompted for interactively by
OpenSSL with a Enter PEM pass phrase:
prompt if a TTY is available. Applications can override the client certificate
prompt and the handling of the sslpassword
parameter by supplying
their own key password callback; see
PQsetSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL
.
For instructions on creating certificates, see 18.9.5절.
The different values for the sslmode
parameter provide different
levels of protection. SSL can provide
protection against three types of attacks:
If a third party can examine the network traffic between the client and the server, it can read both connection information (including the user name and password) and the data that is passed. SSL uses encryption to prevent this.
If a third party can modify the data while passing between the client and server, it can pretend to be the server and therefore see and modify data even if it is encrypted. The third party can then forward the connection information and data to the original server, making it impossible to detect this attack. Common vectors to do this include DNS poisoning and address hijacking, whereby the client is directed to a different server than intended. There are also several other attack methods that can accomplish this. SSL uses certificate verification to prevent this, by authenticating the server to the client.
If a third party can pretend to be an authorized client, it can simply access data it should not have access to. Typically this can happen through insecure password management. SSL uses client certificates to prevent this, by making sure that only holders of valid certificates can access the server.
For a connection to be known SSL-secured, SSL usage must be configured
on both the client and the server before the connection
is made. If it is only configured on the server, the client may end up
sending sensitive information (e.g., passwords) before
it knows that the server requires high security. In libpq, secure
connections can be ensured
by setting the sslmode
parameter to verify-full
or
verify-ca
, and providing the system with a root certificate to
verify against. This is analogous to using an https
URL for encrypted web browsing.
Once the server has been authenticated, the client can pass sensitive data. This means that up until this point, the client does not need to know if certificates will be used for authentication, making it safe to specify that only in the server configuration.
All SSL options carry overhead in the form of encryption and
key-exchange, so there is a trade-off that has to be made between performance
and security. 표 33.1
illustrates the risks the different sslmode
values
protect against, and what statement they make about security and overhead.
표 33.1. SSL Mode Descriptions
sslmode | Eavesdropping protection | MITM protection | Statement |
---|---|---|---|
disable | No | No | I don't care about security, and I don't want to pay the overhead of encryption. |
allow | Maybe | No | I don't care about security, but I will pay the overhead of encryption if the server insists on it. |
prefer | Maybe | No | I don't care about encryption, but I wish to pay the overhead of encryption if the server supports it. |
require | Yes | No | I want my data to be encrypted, and I accept the overhead. I trust that the network will make sure I always connect to the server I want. |
verify-ca | Yes | Depends on CA policy | I want my data encrypted, and I accept the overhead. I want to be sure that I connect to a server that I trust. |
verify-full | Yes | Yes | I want my data encrypted, and I accept the overhead. I want to be sure that I connect to a server I trust, and that it's the one I specify. |
The difference between verify-ca
and verify-full
depends on the policy of the root CA. If a public
CA is used, verify-ca
allows connections to a server
that somebody else may have registered with the CA.
In this case, verify-full
should always be used. If
a local CA is used, or even a self-signed certificate, using
verify-ca
often provides enough protection.
The default value for sslmode
is prefer
. As is shown
in the table, this makes no sense from a security point of view, and it only
promises performance overhead if possible. It is only provided as the default
for backward compatibility, and is not recommended in secure deployments.
표 33.2 summarizes the files that are relevant to the SSL setup on the client.
표 33.2. Libpq/Client SSL File Usage
File | Contents | Effect |
---|---|---|
~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt | client certificate | sent to server |
~/.postgresql/postgresql.key | client private key | proves client certificate sent by owner; does not indicate certificate owner is trustworthy |
~/.postgresql/root.crt | trusted certificate authorities | checks that server certificate is signed by a trusted certificate authority |
~/.postgresql/root.crl | certificates revoked by certificate authorities | server certificate must not be on this list |
If your application initializes libssl
and/or
libcrypto
libraries and libpq
is built with SSL support, you should call
PQinitOpenSSL
to tell libpq
that the libssl
and/or libcrypto
libraries
have been initialized by your application, so that
libpq will not also initialize those libraries.
PQinitOpenSSL
Allows applications to select which security libraries to initialize.
void PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto);
When do_ssl
is non-zero, libpq
will initialize the OpenSSL library before first
opening a database connection. When do_crypto
is
non-zero, the libcrypto
library will be initialized. By
default (if PQinitOpenSSL
is not called), both libraries
are initialized. When SSL support is not compiled in, this function is
present but does nothing.
If your application uses and initializes either OpenSSL
or its underlying libcrypto
library, you must
call this function with zeroes for the appropriate parameter(s)
before first opening a database connection. Also be sure that you
have done that initialization before opening a database connection.
PQinitSSL
Allows applications to select which security libraries to initialize.
void PQinitSSL(int do_ssl);
This function is equivalent to
PQinitOpenSSL(do_ssl, do_ssl)
.
It is sufficient for applications that initialize both or neither
of OpenSSL and libcrypto
.
PQinitSSL
has been present since
PostgreSQL 8.0, while PQinitOpenSSL
was added in PostgreSQL 8.4, so PQinitSSL
might be preferable for applications that need to work with older
versions of libpq.